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1CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
_________________________________________________________
_
It has already become a common understanding that the human factor has had major
contribution behind most accidents at sea and Mozambique shipping is surely not an
exception.  The concept of human factor in many countries has very much been studied
and its influence and behaviour is widely known in the maritime industry today.  So, the
purpose of this dissertation is to identify, analyse and assess the possible specific
causes for accidents in marine engineering operations and how (where) the lack of
safety interacts with the lack of commitment and perhaps the quality in the Mozambican
case and propose appropriate and comprehensive approach to avoid recurrence.
Many studies have shown that the majority of maritime casualties are caused to a higher
extent by the human error of one sort or another.  It is to minimise these errors that the
STCW Convention and the ISM Code were introduced.  Therefore, while the STCW
Convention's key points are that it emphasises on education and training of people as
these are of a critical importance to develop the required skills and competence for
safety at sea; the ISM Code focuses on the improvement of safety management skills of
personnel ashore and afloat.  The effective implementation of these two IMO
instruments is in the end aimed at reducing the human aspect of accidents, thereby
making shipping safer.
The dissertation is also intended to underline and clarify those aspects of safety which
although need to be recognised and dealt with properly by the authorities in
Mozambique, are however neglected and perhaps not tackled more seriously.  Proper
comparative study of the ship accidents provoked by the people factor on the world-
2wide basis can be helpful to understand the need for a proactive approach to the human
factor element in marine engineering in Mozambique.
Based on the lectures at the WMU, research material available and personal
experience, the project is divided into five chapters.  In Chapter I, the introduction
answers the need for selection of the topic, the purpose and goals, including defining
and specifying the aspects which the dissertation will be about and the general views
on the sources of the human factor contributing to casualties.  Chapter II gives a
background of the maritime industry in Mozambique and its approach to safety at sea
outlining the main aspects that can influence safety at sea.  In Chapter III, a comparative
study of certain maritime casualties is made and the role of the human behaviour in
marine engineering casualties is assessed.  The Chapter IV takes a critical look at the
outcome, deals with the reasons, including the managerial, operational and technical
accomplishments for safety.  Finally, conclusion and recommendations are proposed in
Chapter V.  Some statistical figures and tables are also used in chapters II, III and IV to
sustain the analysis.
The Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control signed in June,
1998 of which Mozambique is a founding member will require not only implementation
of the IMO standards, but also an adequate approach to safety at sea including focus on
the human element emerging from the enforcement of synchronised and updated national
laws.
In short, the dissertation is not intended to analyse and discuss concepts, but rather
identify which aspects of human factor in marine engineering are applicable in
Mozambique shipping and what measures would be appropriate.
1.1 General Overview
The loss of people, property and the damage to the environment makes safety at sea a
common interest for society both privately and publicly.  In particular, the human factor
now is considered a very important component of safety wherever is the site of work.
3The working conditions of the engineering officers in Mozambique, in addition to the
fact that most of the ships at sea are difficult to operate, being relatively old and nearly
to be scrapped, are the primary reasons for having chosen this topic.   It is also the
objective to identify the main implicit or explicit causes behind the accidents, which
were primarily provoked by either equipment failure or engineering officer's error.
R. Sunders and T. Weeler, who have studied safety management issues, concluded that
almost all accidents are preventable…the weak link is still the human link.  Even more,
that in everything that we do as human beings there is a risk attached to it (handbook of
safety management, pp 90, 173, 192-198).  Therefore, there is a good reason for
studying deeply this phenomenon to tackle it properly; given that the human factor is
differently influenced by the cultural situation of each country.
The limited amount of information (material) available may however be a strong
constraint.  This constraint is a direct result of the fact that none has studied before, the
human aspect of safety at sea as such in Mozambique.  This being perhaps the first time
that it is being dealt with as study subject.  So, the project will limit itself to what is
possible to say with reasonably scientific relevance in the described situation.
Moreover, the study can be a medium (not an end) to deepen a specialised research in
future with a view to draft a comprehensive approach to the human behaviour,
particularly in marine engineering.
It is always said that the engine room is the heart of a ship.  This could lead one to say
whatever goes wrong in an engine room will determine the future operations of a ship.
The blame for these breakdowns is to be equally placed on the participants involved in
the design and operation of the engine room.
In summary, the goal in this work is to help the maritime industry improve from the
engineering point of view the safety of performance at sea in Mozambique shipping
industry.
41.2 Human Factor Overview
Defining human factor, which is the number-one subject of this work may be the best
way to approach it before going into its main body.  Many scholars have defined this in
different ways depending of course upon the intended approach.  Sanders and
McCormick, for example, defined human factor as being something referring to
designing for human use.  A clear indication of this is perhaps what has been normal
to hear in an engine room or elsewhere: what a dumb way to design this; it is so hard
to use! If only they had done this or that, using it would be so much easier.  This is a
consideration by users as to how it should look and be used, to reach increasingly
higher perfection.  Therefore, it is an indication of human weakness or strength: an
approach of the human factor.  The alluded perfection can be in relation to human use,
safety, decoration, quality, and others. It should, may be, added that human factor refers
to designing for a perfect or to fit in its purpose, optimising working and living
conditions.
Another definition for human factor is that it focuses on human beings and their
interaction with products, equipment, facilities, procedures, and environments used
in work and everyday living. It emphasises on human beings and how the design of
things influences people. It seeks to change the things people use and the
environments in which they use these things to better match the capabilities,
limitations, and needs of people (Sanders, p.4).
Chapanis (1985) however seems to have summarised reasonably all these approaches
into the following definition:
"Human factor discovers and applies information about
human behaviour, abilities, limitations, and other
characteristics to the design of tools, machines, systems,
tasks, jobs, and environments for productive, safe,
comfortable, and effective human use".
5The fact is that many expressions are used today to mean human factor, such as human
element, human error, ergonomics, human engineering, engineering psychology, and
others.  Some people even distinguish between them.  But, at least in practical terms and
for the purpose of this particular work they mean the same thing.  In addition to this, it is
also important to note that the human factor covers a wide range of aspects, some of
them are listed below:
· Fatigue
· Morale
· Motivation
· Loyalty
· Knowledge, skills and attitude
· Standards of Certification
· Conditions of Service
· Management Policies
· Working environment
· Language and Communication
This work is about how these and other factors influence the human behaviour and the
accidents involving casualties in marine engineering operations on board ships in
Mozambique.  What are the sources of errors? Do fatigue, experience, communication
have an influence at all?
When analysing the human factor in marine engineering emphasis lies both on people
and on technical aspects involved.  Here is where there is a tendency of addressing
human factor as a blame that should necessarily be put on somebody.  The aspects
covering human factor listed above are unavoidably related to human beings.  So, if
nothing is done to minimise their effects we can expect what the situation is now and
even worse.  Emphasis should be put on preventing their adverse effects rather than on
remedying.
6CHAPTER TWO
Present Maritime Industry Overview in Mozambique and its
Approach to Safety at Sea
2.1 Overview of the Present Maritime Industry
For the purpose of having full understanding of the ideas being discussed in this project,
overview is given of the present stage of the maritime industry in Mozambique.  As a
result of continuous rise in maritime traffic, involving transportation of passengers,
cargo and mainly increase in fishing activities and realising that existing level of
authority for control of safety at sea was inadequate, the new structure of the maritime
authority at the national level was established, in 1994.
The article 3 of the Decree 34/94 (September, 1st, 1994) that establishes the so called
SAFMAR (the Mozambique National Maritime Safety and Surveillance Administration)
and its framework, states the following:
"It constitutes responsibility of SAFMAR to administer and control maritime activities
within the waters under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Mozambique, along with:
A. Exercising authority within the maritime jurisdiction areas, the lakes,
rivers and the maritime public domain,
B. Exercising control upon the vessels, national crews wherever they are as
well as upon the foreign vessels within the territorial waters,
C. Participating in the drafting of working rules in the maritime field and to
ensure its implementation" (above is the English translation of the
relevant portion of the Decree).
7A better structure that can enhance efficiency and effectiveness, safety at sea is very
much dependent upon the human element.  That is to say how human resources are
motivated, educated and trained.
With particular regard to the human aspect, SAFMAR deals with it through its section
for certification and seamen's registry, where a national record of the seamen is kept
with their rank, level of education and training, experience and other such details.
According to the invigorating Decree 35/94 (September 1st) in relation with STCW
1978, the following levels for engineer officers are recognised:
· Chief Engineer and 1st Engineer, Class A (STCW regulation III/2)
(Chefe de Máquinas e Primeiro-oficial de máquinas, grau A)
· Chief Engineer and 1st Engineer, Class B (STCW regulation III/3)
(Chefe de Máquinas e primeiro-oficial de Máquinas, grau B)
· Engineer Officer in charge of an engineering watch (STCW regulation III/4)
(oficial chefe de quarto de máquinas).
For engineering ratings under the same Decree:
· 1st Motorman (STCW reg. III/6 + 30 months sea service)
(Primeiro motorista)
· 2nd Motorman (STCW reg. III/6 + 30 months sea service)
(Segundo motorista)
· Engine Seaman (STCW reg. III/6 + 24 months sea service)
(Marinheiro motorista)
· Engineboy (STCW reg. III/6 + 6 months sea service)
(Ajudante de motorista).
82.1.1 Maritime Education and Training
Good manning is heavily dependent upon the training of the seafarers and their
experience.  According to a report on manning with reference to human factor, by one of
the UK P & I clubs, manning has now become an increasingly important factor in the
regulation of ships as required by international conventions.  Mozambique has ratified
most of the conventions regarding good manning, excluding the ILO Convention no. 147.
The following relevant IMO instruments have been ratified:
· The STCW Convention (1978) amended in 1995 (certification)
· The International Safety Management Code (chapter IX of the SOLAS
Convention)
· SOLAS 74 (new amendments).
The Mozambique Nautical college (ENM) is the only institution in charge of the
maritime education and training for officers, and occasionally it also runs short courses
for ratings to help the industry overcome shortages in skilled support level seafarers
both for engine and deck departments.  The younger practitioners mainly follow these
courses and the companies do not normally include the older (who represent significant
part of the support level seamen as demonstrated later).  This is of course an undue
practice on the part of the shipping companies.  A good shipping company must invest in
the long run on human resources and at the same time establish a reliable, effective
replacement of seafarers retiring by those coming in.  If the company chooses to keep
older and experienced seafarers, it should then ensure their continuous training on board
or elsewhere to keep up with the requirements.  Taking the lesson of the UK P & I club
report, it is not necessarily true to say that substandard ships always have substandard
crews.  However, a substandard crew almost certainly means a substandard ship.
During the 1970s and 1980s, all shipping and fishing companies were owned in one
way or another by the state, including the unique maritime college itself (ENM).  The
education at the college was complemented by the students' practical on job training on-
board state-owned ships, without any difficulty.  The field studies lasted until the
9students had fulfilled all education and training requirements established by the STCW
78 Convention of which Mozambique is a member since 1985 (BR, p.6).  One of the
requirements was to conclude the record book (designed together with the shipping
companies and the college) with the supervision of a senior engineer officer on board.
At the end of the training, the Chief Engineer officer would sign on the record book
assuring that the student is capable of carrying out basic level requirements and
activities in an engine room.  The record book was required to be concluded in this
manner twice in students' education and training period: at pre-sea level when the
student was preparing to join the college and at post-school level when preparing to
graduate.
Nevertheless, all this has become difficult today, the shipping companies being either
fully private or with the state shares at a symbolic level only.  While the maritime
college can cope with carrying out the theoretical education and training, putting the
students on-board for their practical on job training however requires reaching tough
agreements with the shipping companies.   This has not always been possible.
The STCW 78 revised in 1995, requires in its Regulation III/1 paragraph 2.3 that:
"Every candidate for certification (as an officer in charge of an engineering watch) shall
have completed approved education and training of at least 30 months which includes
on-board training documented in an approved training record book  and meet the
standards of competence specified in section A-III/1 of the STCW Code."
In addition to this, the on-job training program including emergency drills are critically
important for all seamen, specially the older ones who are not included in the short
courses training intended to get them in touch with the day-to-day and emergency
equipment.  The older seamen represent major part of the auxiliary personnel in engine
rooms, as it has been graphically demonstrated in 2.1.4.
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On the other hand, given that the shipowners prefer to fly FOC flags on their ships (and
they are surely free to do so) there is little that the Mozambique administration can do to
control the education and training standards.
The manning procedures have also played a significant part concerning the human factor
effect in ship accidents.  The shipowner hires on his own whomever he is interested in.
The participation of the Local Maritime Administration (LMA) during this process is at
the time when the employed is to be registered on the ship’s manning list. The registry
will occur whenever the requirements have been fulfilled.
This process is good enough for the administration for ensuring that the crewing process
follows the national and international instruments adopted.  However, in the author’s
opinion, it may be necessary to improve it by creating private crewing agencies with
full understanding of the invigorating manning requirements. They would need to be
issued with an authorisation confirming their ability and knowledge of the relevant
instruments to perform this job properly according to the national and international
requirements. Further, they would need to be made responsible to make the
administration aware through concerned companies, of any illegal act, if any, for
appropriate measures.
2.1.2 Standards of Certification and the national law
The maritime education and training has gained its standards with regard to syllabuses
on the world-wide scale after entry into force of STCW 1978.  However, today it is
widely acknowledged that the STCW 78 Convention left gaps leading to different
interpretations.  Mozambique implemented the Convention in 1985 through the
Ministerial Diploma (DM) no. 17/85 (June, 5th). In  1994, this was changed into the
invigorating Governmental Decree (DG) no. 35/94 (September, 1st) alluded before. The
reasons so given for the change were as follows:
1. The DM no. 17/85 contemplated standards only for merchant marine officers.  The
ratings were only required to be issued with a seaman’s book (renewed every 10
years) and no certification took place at their level, apart from the required
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examination at the time they were issued seaman’s book.  This document is mainly
an administrative one, much more concerned with national laws.  Therefore, the
amendments undertaken in 1994 were to consider the need for a comprehensive act
that would include all certification for all the seafarers regardless of their rank, to
upgrade them for the international requirements.
2.  The DM of 1985 left major gaps.  One of which is mentioned in the above
paragraph.  Even the 1994 Decree is not specific regarding the gaps referred to.
However, the enforcement of the STCW 1995 amendments which entered into force
later are also to be considered to bridge the gaps. It is to be remembered that years
before the adoption of the amendments their necessity were widely acknowledged.
3. After a certain period, the DM of 1985 became even obstacle to the development of
the merchant marine labour qualifications.  The DM should have addressed the
problem of the old legal system to avoid ambiguity in its interpretation.
One fact mentioned above, which is also relevant and is directly implying on the
seafarers, including the engine room personnel is the old national maritime legislation in
force in Mozambique.  Following are some of the most directly related provisions:
· General regulations for local maritime administrations (LMAs), in force
since the end of last century, including several amendments, and
·  Regulations for seamen's registry (RIM), in force since the 1930s.
In many cases, these regulations go against the present day spirit of the maritime
qualifications and skill development of the Mozambican seafarers having been drafted
in a colonial view.  For example, according to the invigorating regulations for seamen's
registry, sea service completed by nationals onboard foreign vessels is not considered
relevant for the purpose of enhancing rank.  Such provision finds no back up either in
any of IMO instruments or in any other national maritime law.
The STCW 78 itself was prone to varying interpretations worldwide which were
recognised by the IMO.  In 1995 IMO adopted the amendments to STCW 78.  The
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revised Convention, STCW 95 is already in force since August 1998, but Mozambique
is still now, as this dissertation is written, hardly working onto its implementation.
2.1.3 Working Conditions, morale and motivation
Some of things that strongly influence the performance of human beings at work are
surely the working conditions, morale and motivation (see Appendix ‘Human Element
Analysing Process Flowchart).  It has been common for shipowners to acquire old
ships, nearly to be scrapped and put them sailing in Mozambique.  Furthermore, the low
salary structure, the long working periods, very often of 12 hours a day during sailing, to
which the seafarers are subjected, lead to many problems.  With this scenario fatigue is
unavoidable and morale and motivation, factors directly related to these working
conditions, suffer.  It is not difficult to imagine that the people in these circumstances
work under heavy stress.
Moreover, as it was alluded in the report of the joint session of the joint MSC/MEPC
Working Groups on the human element and on formal safety assessment, “as fatigue
increases, the brain appears to fall asleep involuntarily, against the will of the operator,
especially (but not exclusively) when his performance demands involve sustained
attention and monotony; thus the effects of fatigue on performance are based in changes
in brain function.”  This demonstrates how fatigue is very much linked with the brain
performance, leading one to fall asleep; a situation that must be avoided at all cost.
Among other things the report concludes that the following aspects are direct effects of
fatigue on performance:
1. When a person is suffering from fatigue, his or her performance on the job will be
affected.
2. During night time hours, and to a lesser extent during the mid-afternoon dip, most
types of human performance, whether manual dexterity, mental arithmetic, reaction
time, or cognitive reasoning, are significantly impaired.
3. Fatigue affects the ability to judge distance, speed and time.
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Furthermore, the problems related to attention and ‘perceptual errors’ by seafarers may
be connected to ageing in addition to capability for a duty.
One good example of this, studied at the DMI, is the influence of duration of a watch
(Control Panel monitoring) which varies according to the percentage of signals that are
detected on the screen.  As a result, the number of contacts tends to fall within a matter
of 3 hours. This means that if a man is put on watch for 6 hours as it happens in several
cases in Mozambique, the watch will only be effective during the first half and for the
next half he will be almost ineffective.  This should be considered when allocating
work to the seafarers.
Graph 1
Signal detection and vigilance (attention span)
Source: Psychology of Human Factor, by Michael May, DMI
The influence of duration of watch (Control Panel monitoring) on the
                                 percentage of signals detected on the screen
These are perhaps the reasons why the STCW Convention provides for some
precautions within the companies and the ships.  In fact, the regulation III/1 of STCW
deals with fitness for duty, and sets the standards as follows:
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“Each administration shall, for the purpose of preventing fatigue:
1. establish and enforce rest periods for watchkeeping personnel; and
2. require that watch systems are so arranged that the efficiency of all watchkeeping
personnel is not impaired by fatigue and that duties are so organised that the first
watch at the commencement of a voyage and subsequent relieving watches are
sufficiently rested and otherwise fit for duty.”
Manning, qualifications of the crew, number of crewmembers, its composition,
personnel culture, working language, medical conditions, and competence are
considered to be of a critical importance.  So, by strictly following the ratified STCW
provisions the administration can ensure that problems related to fatigue can not be
alluded in accidents.
Other aspects discussed in this item come under the umbrella of ILO Conventions, some
of which Mozambique has not yet ratified.  Those are minimum standards for medical
examination, prevention of accidents, accommodation of crews, food and catering, and
others.  But, not being party does not impede the country from enforcing them on a
national level and for the purpose of safety.  In fact, some of these requirements are part
of national maritime legislation being implemented since the colonial period. Another
reason for implementing this is the upcoming Indian Ocean MOU on Port State Control
where surely the no more favourable treatment clause will be one of the requirements.
So, Ships flying Mozambican flag will not be exempted from the requirements
comprised in ILO conventions.
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Table II/1
Status of ILO relevant conventions in maritime field in Mozambique
Convention Ratification date Status
C1 Hours of work (Industry)
Convention, 1919
6 June 1977 ratified
C17 Workmen’s Compensation
(Accidents) Convention, 1925
6 June 1977 ratified
C18 Workmen’s Compensation
(occupational diseases) Convention,
1925
6 June 1977 ratified
C122 Employment Policy Convention,
1964
23 December 1996 ratified
Source: ILO web page: http://www.ilo.org
However, in the author’s opinion, regarding influencing aspects of human behaviour,
there are, yet to be ratified by Mozambique some critical ILO instruments that are listed
below:
· Convention 73, regarding medical examinations;
· Convention 109, regarding wages, hours of work;
· Convention 133, regarding crew accommodation;
· Convention 134, regarding prevention of occupational accidents; and
· Convention 147, regarding (minimum standards) merchant shipping.
Another important aspect, yet in the opinion of the author is the ships’ origin.  A
company like NAVIQUE has just scrapped or about to scrap ships acquired from
several and different countries.  The difference in origin may not be very important for
the navigational aspects of a ship; but, for engineering aspects it is certainly critical,
especially when the crews are moved from ships to ships in a matter of months.
The electrical plant on a Russian or Hungarian ship, for example, has shown to be
widely different from that of ships built in Spain or even in Japan, in terms of their
operations.  Examine the following table concerning some of the ships scrapped:
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Table II/2
Name of ship Year built Origin/country Brand/Main Engine
LUGELA 1974 Spain Deutz 358
INHARRIME 1974 Spain Deutz 358
LICUNGO 1966 Hungary Lang 8Id3, srf
CHINDE 1966 Hungary Lang 8Id3, srf
POLANA 1966 The Netherlands Deutz
N’GURI 1977 Spain BMV, 8NVD 48
LUGENDA 1977 Spain BMV, 8NVD 48
Source: SAFMAR, section for ship surveys, 1998
Examining carefully the Table II/2, it can be seen that although a normal lasting age for a
ship is at least 25 years, four of the ships were scrapped even before that age.  One
reason for this is bad maintenance, both for hull and machinery.  The factors fatigue, low
morale and bad maintenance that can lead ships to be prematurely scrapped, these very
reasons can also lead to an accident and vice versa.
2.1.4. Age and Experience     
When Mozambique got its independence in 1975 the sea traffic of Mozambican ships
went quickly down, as a direct result, among others, of shortages of officers who were
Portuguese and left Mozambique shipping services.  Prior to 1975, higher maritime
education and training was not in principle directed to indigenous people.  To keep the
shipping operations going, the government then took measures to employ foreign officers
on its ships simultaneously establishing a core maritime training centre in 1977 which
came to be the maritime college (ENM) in 1985.  The movement of seafarers after
independence did not however involve ratings who were nationals employed since the
colonial period.  This is probably why there has been a prevailing tendency towards
having older people employed as support level seamen in engine rooms compared to
engineering officers.  According to the SAFMAR data available to date, 20% of the
auxiliary personnel in engine rooms are between 51 to 55 years old whereas only 7% of
engineer officers are of that age profile.  This can be demonstrated in the following
graph, where the different bands of age are as follows:
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Band 1 - Under 25 years old
Band 2 – between 26-30 years old
Band 3 – between 31-40 years old
Band 4 – between 41-50 years old
Band 5 – between 51-55 years old
Band 6 – over 55 years old
Graph 2
Source: SAFMAR, section for certification and seamen’s registry
A quick study of this data will lead to a conclusion that the replacement process is
ineffective.  In other words, the number of younger auxiliary people getting in is far
smaller compared to the number of people retiring.  Another reason that leads to this
situation is the fact that there is no training school for ratings in the country. As
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mentioned before, occasional short courses are provided by the maritime college for
ratings when they are requested and paid for by shipping companies.  However, it can
also be that the shipowners have preference to older ratings either because not only they
can pay them less but also they have much experienced persons for work because of
their longer career.
In fact, auxiliary people who are on their job since last 30 years are certainly more
experienced in their duties than the officers considering the long period in the career.
Taking random samples of 40 engineer officers and 40 engineering ratings, the scenario
found was as the table II/3 shows below with respect to the period they joined the sea
career.
Table II/3
Rank/Period 1965 1975 1985 1995
Engineer officers 0%(0) 7%(3) 56%(22) 37%(15)
Engine ratings 58%(23) 28%(11) 10%(4) 4%(2)
Source: SAFMAR, section for certification and seamen’s registry, 1998
What is addressed in the previous paragraph may not be totally true if taken into
consideration that of the problems facing the shipping industry was due to the lack of
corresponding rewards and incentives.  So, the relatively easy access to job on land by
officers than their colleagues at lower level could be pointed.  The smaller number of
officers working onboard in the age bands of 5 and 6 may respond to the position
demonstrated in the graph 1, for which the author calls for attention.  This shows that
old ratings keep working onboard for longer periods of their lives.  The age and
experience can influence both positively and negatively.  What is required is to make
sure that those performing their duties are reasonably able as far as safety is concerned.
Similarly, the manning procedures play a significant role not only in minimising the
problems related to age, but also concerning the need to minimise the human factor
effect on accidents.  While manning ships, the agencies and companies must ensure
compliance with the STCW 95 requirements concerning manning.
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On the other hand, as demonstrated in a study by Michael May, of the Danish Maritime
Institute, errors are classified in four different dimensions:
· Skill-based error (e.g. slips, lapses)
· Rule-based error (e.g. wrong rules, misapplication of rules)
· Knowledge-based error (e.g. biases, mistakes, and symptoms)
· Violations (e.g. exceptions, routines, and sabotage)
Within the skill-based error types these could comprise, in the opinion of the author, the
error resulting from the age-related problems such as poor eye sight reflexes,
inflexibility, lack of vigour, and others such as lack of training.  The comparison
between the age pattern of seafarers world-wide and those in Mozambique clearly
shows that whereas the Mozambican engineer officers follow almost the world’s
pattern of age profile, the situation seems different in case of ratings, where the
Mozambicans tend to be older as it is demonstrated bellow.
Table II/4
Comparison of Age of Seafarers (World-Mozambique)
Age bands Officers Ratings
World                      Mozambique World                       Mozambique
Under 25 8 %                           3 % 10%                           5 %
26-30 15%                          27 % 16%                           11 %
31-40 31%                          36 % 30%                           28%
41-50 28%                          26 % 26/                             33 %
51-55 10%                          8 % 9%                             20 %
Over 55 6%                            0 % 5%                             3 %
Source: BIMCO, 1997, and SAFMAR’s  certification and seamen’s register section
2.1.5 Language and Communication
Regarding communication aspects of the human factor, it seems irrelevant for the
purpose of this subject if it is considered that not many foreign people are employed on
Mozambican ships with whom communication has been or can be a major problem.  In
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fact, the shipping companies have not employed significant foreign crew and further
they are engaged in traffic, which is limited mainly to the defined cabotage borders.
However, attention should be paid to the fact that not many seafarers or shipping
managers have realised the problem that it can be there due to lack of good flow of
information among the involved people in the net.  One of the UK P & I Club report on
human factor mentions that “in some quarters in recent years, it has been suggested that
a range of serious risks can be attributed to mixed crews”.  That is not the case here.
Nevertheless, the same report states: “while it cannot be denied that mixed crews
present problems not found among crews of a single nationality with a common
language, such assumptions may be proved to be too simple.”  And it continues “the fact
that so many ships are crewed in this way itself argues against such conclusions.”
Many scholars today are bringing all this about.  In fact, Jerry Dzugan, in his invaluable
work on Cross cultural communication: implications for maritime mariners,
mentions That “mariners work in one of the world’s most international environments”
and he calls for “a need to educate them fully in aspects of cross cultural
communication to ensure safer and more effective shipping”.  He added value to the
debate pointing out eleven cultural barriers that he considers to often get in the way of
effective communication with a great impact on marine safety.
Although the Mozambique shipping industry does not face the problem of mixed crews,
the communication problems still exist, which may be due to the power difference,
cultural backgrounds and traditions.  For example, a ship where the Master, because of
differences in opinions with the personnel, communicates with the Chief Engineer or
the crew through the Mate and avoids direct dealing.  It is not necessary to say this is
unacceptable.  Differences in opinions in general is one of that aspects that are very
much common onboard ships in Mozambique leading to non-effective communication
among the key crew members.  This is a matter for both the management and the Safety
Management Certificate (SMC) and Document of Compliance (DOC) issuing authority
to take measures against.
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In the author’s opinion, neither of this can however be taken as a serious challenge in an
environment of a single nationality with a common language, which would be
applicable to the present question.
2.2. Quality and safety in management policies and operation of ships
In Captain Jan Horck’s opinion, a demonstration of quality is becoming a condition of
doing business in the maritime industries and that choice elevates quality requirements.
It would be to add that quality also has much supplementary benefit besides increasing
safety and improving an overall operational performance.  Indeed, demonstration of
quality classifies those that are competent from the others and gradually quality brings
its own reward.
Investment in training to keep staff updated contributes to quality and pays for itself.
The final result will take to cost reduction of an implemented quality management
system.  As the ISM and STCW 95 recommend, there is a need for company loyalty and
continuity of staff on board ships.  This goes back to the question of familiarisation,
experience, and effective communication among the crew members required from the
personnel on the ship where they perform.  Hence, it is considered to be a very
important ingredient in quality assurance required for all institutions involved in
maritime education and training.  The requirements for quality and documentation of
training under the STCW regulation 1/6 and 1/8 forces  administration, training
institutions and company to be in control of all competence building activities.  In
addition, the documentation and these procedures must be approved by the
Administration in order to be a part of the professional education.
Moreover, with the ISM Code and the STCW Convention so nicely harmonised, it is
necessary to document training related to STCW in the ISM safety management system
(see Appendices C and D).  In other words, the fact that these two instruments have
common goals, the STCW requirements regarding this aspect can be integrated and
documented into the procedures and requirements of the safety management system.
When the company has implemented and is operating a formal training system within its
SMS, it would hardly be practical to maintain voluntary company training outside the
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scope of the SMS.  The STCW Convention shifts a major part of the responsibility for
competence building related to professional certificates over to the shipping company,
as more and more of the training is to be done in-service.  The fact, however, is that
without top management’s attention and commitment, the implementation of STCW 95
and ISM Code are likely be less effective, more costly and time consuming, and hence
will reduce the company’s competitive advantage.  So, even in Mozambique it is better
that the companies move towards the implementation direction.
Enforcing the STCW and ISM Code is not all.  A quality assurance scheme should be
considered not only as a requirement for the maritime college (ENM), but also, as a
system to be consistently established in all governmental and private organisations
related to ship operations.  Consistently because it should be a system of which
feedback should be seriously taken into consideration for re-examining their contents.
Prof. Mottram warns that “the objective of a quality system should certainly not be seen
as increasing bureaucracy.  On the contrary, defining processes and procedures should
be seen as a golden opportunity to simplify things, and more importantly, push decision
making down the organisation.” In fact, the risk for heavier bureaucracy has to be
recognised when evaluating the need for these schemes.  On the contrary, this requires
innovation and need for a proactive attitude. In the opinion of Prof. Mottram, “true
quality can only come from giving people not only procedures, but also authority.”  To
satisfy the Administration’s demand, some shipping companies may feel tempted to
nominate people for certain alluded tasks without necessarily giving them the authority
they need to act.  This will not produce desired results.  Secondly, there should be right
persons for the right positions to give them the required authority.
As specified by the ISM Code, for example, on ships there is required designated
person (DP) with authority and direct access to the highest level of management.  His
specific task is monitoring the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the ship
operation.  In the author’s opinion, the DP ought to be a person with shipboard
knowledge and experience.  In the case of Mozambique, many of the shore-based
personnel in most shipping companies have no background of maritime subjects and
this makes the management in general and safety management in particular difficult as
required today by international instruments.  A change towards appropriate and
23
‘exceptional’ people will have to take place by either training the employed or by
hiring suitable people accordingly.
If quality is defined as being best satisfaction of customer’s requirements at the lowest
cost (ISO 9000 series); safety is defined as having control over accident risks and
damage costs; and environmental protection is defined as reducing and avoiding
harmful effects by different means; one can affirm that the three concepts are
interconnected in a way that they all aim at reducing risks and improving the
performance of shipping trade and therefore they have the same priority. Hence quality
is important and comes hand in hand with safety and accident prevention which is the
subject here.
As more and more companies today are finding that certification is a requirement for
obtaining critical contracts, it has to be assumed that quality standards are there to help
for a better quality management and for the industry to reduce casualties.  In
Mozambique, audits are usually conducted at the Administration and if they are taken
seriously they will become, after a certain period of time, a culture, a day-to-day tool
for work and management in that governmental office.  But, this move should also go on
to encouraging the companies themselves in the industry to enforce quality systems and
the administration to make sure that these are in place and seriously tackled.
In Sweden, for example, shipping companies are successfully implementing this
strategy. The Swedish shipping company Concordia Maritime AB is one example of
that and the sketch below describes this.
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Sketch 1
Source: Quality Management: ISO 9000 series (handout, WMU)
Therefore the quality system to be implemented require establishment of written
procedures. It improves operations (engine room operations in this case) and thus
reduces the risks associated with human factors that have led to accidents.
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CHAPTER THREE
Casualties and the role of the human factor in marine engineering. A
comparative study
_________________________________________________________
__
Ship safety involves many aspects beyond the people, ashore and aboard involved in
direct operations. Among other things it involves:
· ship construction and equipment (design),
· ship management system (management),
· Skills and abilities of employed people (operation).
This chapter is particularly concerned with analysing safety as it relates to the crew and
its performance.  However, there can also be reference to the human aspect of ship
construction and management considering the influence they can pose to ship’s safety.
3.1 Shipboard maintenance approach
As it was discussed in chapter II, shipboard maintenance plays an important role in
avoiding casualties.  In Mozambique, there has been a lack of funds availability in most
shipping and fishing companies to address all the needs of maintenance, including the
high cost for spare parts.  In addition, the lack of commitment by management, are the
primary reasons for bad maintenance in ships.
In marine engineering operations, many scholars believe that mainly the general and
running repairs of deck machinery, hull integrity, and lifting gear, are very sensitive
sectors of engineering where regular attention is required.  There exists lack of
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proactive approach to safety and creation of the habit for maintenance planning is to be
strictly fulfilled by engineer officers.  The following table, compiled from an inquiry
report to seafarers, demonstrates how seafarers are not really aware and pay less
attention to the need for maintenance in engineering.
Table III/1
Risk areas identified by seafarers Percentage of seafarers
Safety equipment (LSA & fire fighting)
Deck machinery
Hull integrity (incl. Hatches, WT doors)
Lifting gear
Corrosion prevention/painting
Electronics (incl. Bridge & navigation equipment)
Engineering (general, running repairs)
Maintenance planning
84 per cent
62 per cent
54 per cent
50 per cent
50 per cent
38 per cent
32 per cent
24 per cent
Source: Bimco review, 1996: "setting the industry's training agenda"
To Comment on the table III/1, it can be said that the seafarers themselves did not, in
this example, think that maintenance in engineering is as important as say safety
equipment.  However, in Prof. Mottram’s opinion, there is a need for a proactive
culture towards safety at sea by way of risk management.  Officers should tackle it in a
manner that the first priority should be laid for the more risky elements of the ship.  In
the author's opinion, the running devices of the engines are critically essential. The
following sketch brings together these ideas.
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Framework for Risk prevention
Sketch 2
Source: ‘risk and reliability in marine technology – human factors in marine accidents
The crew evaluates on their ship what items in the engine room and hull are highly risky
and how often they should be maintained.  The older the ship, the more demanding the
maintenance.  Recommendations from the manufacturers are to be strictly followed and
a list so written must be distributed or displayed.
General knowledge
- theories of human error
- safe work practices
- risk analysis techniques
- occupational health knowledge
Overall
Strategy
-Proactive approach
-Eliminate error inducing
conditions
- Audits
- Retrospective approach
- Identify recurrent causes
from accidents
-Organisational approach
-Cultural change
Policies that supports safe
operation and behaviour
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Moreover, as it can be seen from the sketch, this approach involves all the system of the
shipping company, and it ends on the ship itself.  Regarding general knowledge, not
only the crew has to get to know the general aspects of theories of human error, safe
work practices, risk analysis techniques, and occupational health knowledge; but also
the shore management.  This can help a company to set up a comprehensive program
aimed at reducing or eliminating error inducing conditions, as required by the ISM
Code.
Identifying causes from previous accidents is going to be the critical part of such risk
assessment for prioritising the risk elements.  This is of course a very general and
strategic approach which involves company cultural change, involves setting up
policies to support safe operation and behaviour.  However, it is an approach, which is
essential. The following sketch regarding machinery condition monitoring, summarises
the result of the elements involved an analysis to the input and output of such an
assessment.
Sketch 3
        
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1996
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It is also important for crew to know how much both, the ship and shore management,
are concerned with such a framework for risk prevention and how much they are
willing to invest in it to get to safe working practices as a standard principle.
Ordering, for example, spare parts for the engine staff has frequently been a matter of
disagreement between ship and shore management in Mozambique.  The ship
management is concerned with safe operations of the ship, which makes them directly
involved.  But, the fact that they may feel that the shore management is very much
concerned with savings, their disposition, willingness and ability to do that is self-
discouraged.  Therefore, unconditional commitment from both sides has to be
demonstrated to reduce the effect of human factor, which may be caused due to
discouragement from the shore management towards proactive approach.
3.2  Reports of sample accidents and incidents and the role of the human factor in
shipboard marine engineering operations
When an accident occurs, the Government or the Ministry of Transport and
Communications, depending on the magnitude of the accident, nominates an inquiry
committee. This procedure is undertaken on an ad hoc basis to clarify only the accident
in question.  Further, there is a lack of a legal regime to be followed by the committee
in such circumstances.
If the accident is of a great magnitude, there is also a temptation to nominate a
committee that is very much political rather than technical or professional. These
actions lead to results of inquiries that may help identify circumstances for the
particular accident, but very rarely identify safeguards for future and provide guidance
for technical or professional purposes. Following some of the examples indicate the
errors related to human factors applicable to operations that contributed to accidents.
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3.2.1 The Katina P disaster
The vulnerability of the Mozambique coast does not only result from the Mozambique-
flagged ships, but also from the foreign ships mainly VLCC tankers going from the
Middle East, through the Mozambique Channel and Cape of Good Hope in South
Africa, to Europe and America.
In April 1992 the Maltese motor tanker Katina P  broke in two off the Mozambique
coast, and substantial pollution was reported to have occurred.  The 26-year-old vessel
was on her voyage from Venezuela to Fujairan, loaded with 66,700 tons of heavy fuel
oil valued at US§4.5m (Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services on its report on
Maritime Casualties 1963-1996).  The Katina P was disabled by freak wave which
necessitated beaching her on a sandbar at the mouth of Maputo Bay, six miles offshore,
to prevent her from sinking, on April 17.  Severe damage was sustained to the
amidships area, with a gaping hole in her side causing oil to gush into the Indian Ocean
waters in a area heavily harvested for prawns and other seafood.
To avoid further pollution of the Mozambique coast, the Katina P was refloated and
towed out to sea, but she broke in two approximately 100 miles off Mozambique on
April 26, sinking.  However, a substantial amount of oil escaped from her tanks when
she sank.
The Mozambique authorities demanded massive compensation in respect of the
pollution problem.  There were reports of authorities preparing to file criminal charges
against the Greek master Trifon Kalaitzakis for “negligently spilling oil and obstructing
the resulting inquiry.  The final report on the accident listed the following causes:
Regarding the ship:
· The master neglected the rough weather and did not ask for assistance when
cracks were discovered on the hull along the South African coast.
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· Despite having valid certificates issued by both the class (HELLENIC
REGISTER) and the Maltese maritime authorities, the ship was clearly
unseaworthy. It did not fulfil the SOLAS requirements.
Regarding crew documentation:
· There were engineers without certificates to sail on tankers.
The STCW regulation V/1, concerning requirements for the training and qualification of
masters, officers and ratings on tankers, states the following:
“ 1. Officers and ratings assigned specific duties and responsibilities related to cargo
or cargo equipment on tankers shall have completed an approved shore-based fire-
fighting course in addition to the training required by regulation VI/1 and shall have
completed:
a) at least three months of approved seagoing service on tankers in order to acquire
adequate knowledge of safe operational practices; or
b) an approved tanker familiarisation course covering at least the syllabus given for
that course in section A-V/1 of the STCW Code”
The Convention establishes the limitations and exemptions permissible, and further,
requires issuance of adequate certificates or endorsements for masters and officers
including the engineer officers.
Regarding ship operation:
· During inquiry several persons were prompted to mention ‘freak waves’ as
the primary reason, but the log books did not have any mention of that.
· The engine power was kept for full speed all along the voyage despite
heavy weather. This was believed to have worsened the conditions of the
ship.
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Regarding captainship:
· The master joined the vessel after earlier master was dismissed for
neglecting further investigation on a spill. The master took over during
loading and hence was without any sufficient familiarisation.
· Crew reduction took place immediately before departure resulting in
conditions of fatigue and unfitness for the remaining crew.
· The vessel did not have a qualified First Mate. The final report gives no
further detail.
Apart from not having appropriate certificates, the engineer officers were at fault for
not making proper entries in the logbooks regarding the alluded ‘freak waves’.  The
inquiry concluded that this was one of the contributing faults from the engine department
officers.  Had there been good relationship among the officers, the engineers could have
discussed with the master the problems that could be foreseen due to running engines at
full speed in freak waves.  This could have resulted in the master ordering slowing
down.  Furthermore, the crew reduction that took place immediately before departure
was a violation of the STCW ‘fitness for duty’ requirement as was mentioned in
chapter II.  In a 3 to 4 weeks trip, watches of 6 hours each, leads certainly to fatigue
and ineffective performance by the officers.
These data show by itself the influence from the engineering side of the accident, which
led to heavy avoidable losses not only for Mozambique as a coastal country, but also to
the company itself.  Specifically the report outlined losses in the following production
sectors:
· Fishing,
· Salt industry,
· Mozambican electrical company (EDM),
· Tourism.
In general terms, except for some missing certificates and documents, the vessel seemed
to have documentation in order.  The absence of the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate
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made it impossible to establish with certainty whether the vessel was properly manned.
Doubts could be raised in relation to number of officers.
Document of survey status was presented and showed no major pending items.
However, a quick survey on board the vessel by Mozambican authorities gave an
impression very much different.  The vessel was generally in bad condition and rust
was all over decks, plates, pipes etc.  It gave the very clear impression of an old
substandard ship.  South African surveyors got to the same conclusions afterwards.
Another statement, related to human factor, is the changes, which had been made in the
entries in the deck logbook.  The explanation given by the crew was the situation of
stress and panic.  Nevertheless, the four categories of human factor as mentioned
earlier in paragraph 3.1.2 allude the misapplication of rules as a rule-based error and
sabotage as a violation.  Probably further examination would have thrown more light in
identifying the actual error.
This accident is an example of how a chain of wrong professional behaviour both by
shore, ship management, and officers can lead to damages on the people, property and
environment.  A ship with damage on the hull is knowingly loaded with cargo for a
three-four months trip; the master fails to act when the ship is in danger and continues
the trip without asking for help, the officers fail to act correctly.  The result is a
compensation claim of more than USD§10.7m apart from the other damages.  Indeed,
comparing the values of damages and that of the cargo carried, the situation appears as
it is shown below where the damages constitute more than 2.3 times the value of the
cargo itself.
Table III/2
Value of cargo carried Alleged value of damages (claim)
US § 4.5 million US § 10.7 million
Source: Final report of the Katina P accident and the issue of Maritime casualties 1963 and
1996.
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3.2.2 Collision between NORA and SOBROSO
In the case of the collision accident that took place on August, 8th 1997, in Pebane
northern Mozambique between the fishing vessel NORA and the bunkering motor vessel
SOBROSO, the particulars of the two ships were as follows:
NORA is a ship intended for trawling, registered in Sydney (Australia), 31 meters of
length between perpendiculars, and at the time of the accident it was licensed to fish in
Mozambique waters.
Regarding SOBROSO, it is intended to assist fishing vessels on high seas bunkering fuel
and lube oil, including similar jobs.  Owned by the Mozambican fishing company,
PESCAMAR, SOBROSO is registered in Mozambique, 48 meters in length between
perpendiculars.  The two ships collided while on their duties near Pebane, causing
heavy damages on both ships, but fortunately without loss of life (see Appendix
showing chart of the collision).
The contribution of the engineering operations towards accident was assessed by the
inquiry as follows:
- Application of excessive speed by the M/V SOBROSO in a situation whereby
several ships were engaged in fishing.
- During the operation it was found that rudder response was defective.  This is of
course the full responsibility of the engineer officers to make sure that the
equipment in machinery installations works properly.
- Even when the accident was imminent the main engines were still running at full
power.  In spite of the fact that the master is the only responsible person for taking
the necessary measures and ordering slowing down or stoppage, in such
circumstances it would have been better for the chief engineer to act within his
authority and discuss the situation with the master for safety of the vessel.
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The assessment to these given three items involving engine room operations seems very
much related to master’s ability to evaluate the situation and act accordingly. However,
in the author’s opinion, the engineer officers have also responsibility in making sure
that everything works properly.  It should not be at the time of an accident that it is
realised that a very important machinery installation like steering gear system does not
respond.
Maintenance is, in the author’s opinion, the key aspect mainly when it comes to older
ships.  In this example of SOBROSO, built in 1962 and 35 years old at the time of the
accident, it is believed that if proper maintenance of the steering gear system was
followed this accident would have been avoided and thus the 70 % of blame on it for
the damages avoided.
According to the Institute of London Underwriters (ILU), between 1991 and 1998, 95
bulk carriers were totally lost due to accidents with different causes involving
machinery.  Of these only 8 accidents, representing 8.4 % of total were caused by the
failure of machinery or related to it.  In addition, it is noticed that among these 8 ships
lost due to machinery failure, only one was 3 years old and all the others were ships
older than 14 years. It is not difficult to imagine that lack of maintenance may have been
the primary cause of the accidents, given their age profile.  This stresses much more the
need for proper maintenance, especially on such older ships.  Table III/3 shows the age
profile of these eight ships.
Table III/3
Total losses 1991-1998 in bulk carriers
Year of
accident
Vessel name Age
(years)
Cause of
accident
1992 Pegasus 20 Machinery, etc
1992 Afthoros 23 Machinery, etc
1992 Arisan 18 Machinery, etc
1994 Shipbroker 14 Machinery, etc
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1994 Ocean Lucky 23 Machinery, etc
1995 You Xiu 3 Machinery, etc
1995 Paris 24 Machinery, etc
1996 Herculus 26 Machinery, etc
Source: Modified from The Institute of London Underwriters’ table (ILU), 1998
3.2.3 Aleutian Enterprise capsizing and sinking
It can also be useful to overview human factor related accidents abroad, to draw an
idea on causes and to get clear indication of what is to be done to avoid future
recurrence.
The ALEUTIAN ENTERPRISE  was a US fish processing vessel operating in the Bering
Sea.  It departed Dutch Harbor, Alaska on 2 March 1990 and conducted normal
trawling activities until 22 March, when at 0800 the master relieved the chief officer.
This was the last trawl to be conducted before return to port.  That day the vessel
capsized and sank.
The ship was equipped with trawl cable tension indicators to allow the crew be aware
when the trawl net was full and ready to be hauled in.  During the early hauling process
the ship had a 3-to-4 degree port list that the master considered it to be normal in the
existing circumstances.  When the vessel’s list increased from 15 to 20 degrees
(unusual), the master telephoned the chief engineer to ask why such a list.  According to
the master, the chief engineer answered that he was transferring fuel from port to
starboard tanks to alleviate the list.
However, the list increased and seawater ingress started into the ship through hull
openings and it sank.  Twelve persons were reported dead including the chief engineer
in the engine room.
Although the report does not mention what the causes are thought to be, there are
interesting points related to human aspects to bear in mind as a lesson to be learnt from
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this accident. According to the master’s testimony the work shifts were of 16 hours on
duty and 8 hours off duty.  In case of Mozambique, also this workload is normal
especially in fishing vessels where the companies together with the masters decide the
workload and the administration has little knowledge of what happens.
Several survivors of the ALEUTIAN ENTERPRISE stated that they had received no
formal training in commercial fishing, use of safety equipment, survival procedures, or
cold water survival.  Some of the 12 persons lost, died as a result of bad survival
preparedness both, in the use of equipment and survival procedures in water.
Even though the vessel did have videotapes of training courses and safety manuals, the
survivors stated that with their workload, sleep was more important than watching the
tapes during rest periods.
Further, the assistant engineer stated that the chief engineer was well organised and had
been developing a maintenance schedule and logs for all the engineering functions on
board the vessel.  But, these were supposed to be in place before the ship is put in
service or before it departs for its trip.  It should not be a thing that is indefinitely
developed while the ship is operating.  As previously stated a maintenance schedule
especially in engineering operations is critical to avoiding not only accidents, but also
premature scrapping.
In addition, the ALEUTIAN ENTERPRISE’s company was reputed to offer a salary
bonus to captains who saved money on safety equipment purchases.  Which means that
if the master could save as much as possible by purchasing cheaper equipment he
would be rewarded.  Motivation is of course a factor of the human element, but here it
was clearly enforced at the expense of safety.  This shows how the companies can be
heavily involved in discouraging the seafarers to act safely and in promoting breaking
safety requirements for money; posing risk to people, property, and environment.
During 1980s and early 1990s, a similar non-written rule was widely spread in some
fishing and even shipping companies.  It is believed even today in several fishing
companies in Mozambique that the lesser is the money asked from the shore
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management, the better the reward ship's people get.  It is not necessary to say that this
is a kick on the ship’s safety requirements.  In fishing vessels, it has been usual to put
pressure on the crews to maintain high fish production and relate it to job retention by
the seafarers.  Thus making the seafarers work under tremendous pressures of job
security and mental stress.
This could be one of the reasons for the drug and alcohol abuse, which has frequently
been a problem in the shipping and fishing companies in Mozambique.  In this reported
accident, a crewmember stated that he was aware of some of his colleagues drinking
and smoking marijuana after their work shifts.  Which meant that when they went to
sleep they could not be easily woken up.  It is a question also requiring such
comprehensive approach in Mozambique so that appropriate measures are taken to
safeguard against these kinds of unsafe practices.
3.3 Man versus Machine Interface
Throughout the previous chapters, matters of human factor affecting technical
requirements, manning, training, management and work environment areas were
discussed.  Turning now over to man versus machine interface, some of the facts in this
relationship are sufficiently relevant to address.
The report of the joint session of the joint MSC/MEPC working group on the human
element and on Formal Safety Assessment presented to the MEPC 42nd Session, defined
man/machine interface as involving the compatibility of ship design and equipment
design with the individuals that work on a ship or use the equipment.  It continues on to
say that the man/machine interface includes issues such as human input aspects, easily
understood information display and the interaction between the human operator and the
‘machine’.
Looking at the Mozambican case, this is really what happens on the ground.  The fact
that different ships, in the same company, come from different origins, as mentioned
before, from Russia and Hungary to German and Spain, can be a strong constraint for
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the men working on them and when being moved from one ship to another within short
periods of time.
For example, electrical boards including all engine equipment on Spanish built ships
LUGENDA and N’GURI  (now scrapped) had indications written in Spanish.  The same
happened with Hungarian ships LICUNGO and CHINDE.  Undoubtedly, this situation
poses a great danger for the fact that the men could not read or understand neither of
these languages.  One can argue that familiarisation could take place but in an
emergency situation people’s behaviour tends to change and even more so when the
crewmembers are moved in the circumstances mentioned before.
It would be of a great interest for the maritime industry to reach a common design and
layout standard.  In fact, the report mentions that the aim is to achieve such uniform
design and layout so as to use internationally recognised symbols on equipment
controls, using established ergonomics principles, criteria and requirements.  This
should be combined with appropriate education and training. Furthermore, the STCW
Code requires that the officer must have adequate knowledge of the English language to
enable him to use engineering publications and to perform engineering duties.  In
addition, the vessels should have proper translations into a common language.
However, it is widely known as to how this is far from being achieved today in the
maritime industry.  For example, many decades after the international system for units
was established, the industry still faces the challenge of conversions from Inches, foot
and miles into centimetres, meters and kilometres; from British Thermal Unit (BTU) or
Fahrenheit degrees into centigrade; from bar into Pascal and so on.  Hence, the best
thing for the shipping companies in Mozambique would be to try to achieve uniformity
by purchasing ships from the same origin or same standard rules.
In 1990, the then State Bureau for Fisheries in Mozambique (SEP) purchased, from a
Japanese shipyard, the bunkering ship SENA which was later in the same year handed
over to a company that would operate it.  At the end of 1996, the ship was laid up off
for more than a year due to major mechanical problems.  The author believes that
maintenance again may have been at the root of this situation based on the fact that most
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instruction manuals are in Japanese and not many translated instructions are provided
that would help the crew to effectively undertake the recommended maintenance.  The
damages here are clear, new ship (6 years) laid for more than a year for mechanical
problems which could have been avoided if proper maintenance regime could be
followed.
LIAZI, formerly Sternberg, is one of the ships acquired by NAVIQUE from a
Scandinavian shipping company, relatively new and operative but now awaiting for
repairs.  Since late in 1996, LIAZI has had a major problem which is that the engine can
not provide astern manoeuvre.  Another example is POLANA where steering gear and
rudder breakdown led to its premature and undue scrapping while it was well
operating.
The representative cases mentioned above are very limited in numbers as it is neither
possible nor desirable for the scope of this dissertation to discuss more of such
incidents.  All these incidents clearly show the pattern of human behaviour and the kind
of accidents they might lead to.  It is to be recognised that it is difficult to determine
with certainty their primary reason. Of course comprehensive analysis must take place
to do that.  However, this can also be said that there seems to be a frequent, common
and chronic pattern of misbehaviour related to human errors, both technical and
professional, that implicitly is the root cause for accidents, as the evidence tends to
suggest.
3.4  The role of the classification societies in minimising hazards
The accepted and wide practice today is to get the expertise of the classification
societies to reduce hazards through delegation of some of the Flag State prerogatives
and obligations under IMO requirements.  In doing this, the Flag State must bear in
mind that while authority is important for the classes to undertake their job on behalf of
the Flag State, responsibility still lies on the Flag State.  But, many Flag States
including Mozambique do not have all the expertise they need to do the job.  So, they
have to delegate.
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The Classification Societies, when authorised by the Flag State, can carry out surveys
and inspections mainly on board vessels of 500 GT and above.  Of course the
conditions for such a job and the tasks must be spelled out in a bilateral agreement
involving the Flag State and the Class or Classes.  The authorisation usually follows the
guidelines of a IMO model agreement set for this purpose to establish the rights and
duties with regard to the general conditions, information and liaison, supervision of the
Class, applicable instruments, reporting procedures, unscheduled inspections
performed by the class, and the corrective action to be taken as well as withdrawal of
certificates.
The Class is obliged, under the agreement, to ensure that the work undertaken by the
society is carried out by qualified personnel, and will to the best of its ability see that
the work is carried out to the satisfaction of the Administration.  In addition, for all
surveys the Class have a systematic order of rules, instructions, procedures, reporting
routines, acceptance criteria where relevant, and routines for checking, all to ensure
that the relevant requirements are applicable and that a sufficient versatility is
incorporated.
The Administration can also require that the Class is certified under ISO 9001
standards for quality systems in connection with the work carried.
In particular, the Administration in Mozambique will certainly encounter the necessity
to hold such agreements, now that the Indian Ocean MOU on Port State Control is in
place. The Administration surveyors can then concentrate on surveying and inspecting
ships of 500 GT and below where generally SOLAS and MARPOL requirements do
not apply.
The classification societies have also the moral obligation to inspire responsibility in
their clients, including the flag states.  When undertaking their duties on behalf of flag
states, they are required to demonstrate responsibility with their job.  The contrary
would send a bad message.  For example, the final report on the inquiry of the Katina P
disaster, claimed the need to send a protesting report to the IMO and the Greek Ministry
of Maritime Affairs, regarding the work undertaken by the class HELLENIC
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REGISTER, especially on the ships going through the Mozambique Channel.  The report
indicated the following cases:
· M/V OCEANOS, classed by HELLENIC REGISTER, sank in August 1991,
in the Mozambique Channel.
· M/T KATINA P, classed by HELLENIC REGISTER, sank in April 1992,
95 miles from the Mozambique coast.
· M/V AFTHOROS, classed by HELLENIC REGISTER, nearly sank in May
1992, at Richards Bay.
In a way this is an indication of lack of responsibility by a class.  Within a matter of
one year, three ships classed by the same society having major problems in the same
area of the world.  It is easy to imagine that the problems are with the class. Katina P,
for example, was issued all the necessary documents to sail by the class even with rust
all over and even some holes on the hull.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Examining the managerial, operational and technical complements to
the human behaviour
4.1 The need to investigate marine accidents in Mozambique
Accidents do not have to happen.  They can be prevented with proper knowledge,
preparation, and attention.  What is needed first is the knowledge of risk for various
accident precursor situations.  With a reliable/consistent collection of accidents and
incidents data, levels of risk can be assessed and that information can be applied
judiciously to achieve safety and efficiency goals.  Although accidents are infrequent,
but their chances are always present, hence accident investigations provide a source of
information that is commonly used as basis for prevention.
In general terms, accidents in maritime industry should be investigated, among other
things to:
· Educate people and engage them in prevention of  recurrences,
· Determine responsibility and liability,
· Update legal requirements of the involved maritime authorities, and
· Analyse causes to address the actual problem.
But, avoiding recurrence is very much dependent upon the operator's training
(professionalism) and thus minimisation of operational and technical wrong doings
which goes back to the human element.
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In specific terms, it could be said that investigating accidents is also a concern for
precise decisions as to how much emphasis on human aspects should be put to avoid
such recurrences.
In Mozambique, there is a need to investigate accidents for establishing facts and
consider them for training purposes in maritime colleges or training schools for
seamen. Not only facts related to put blame and liability but also to the technical,
professional doings and the need for updating the national maritime legislation based on
the local experience (see Appendices A and B).  This requires a bureau of maritime
accidents and incidents investigation comprising purely technical and professional
people who have the required experience in the field.
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) report of the MSC 69/13/1 of 30
January 1998 titled, ‘role of the human element in maritime casualties', the Joint
ILO/IMO ad hoc working group on investigation of human factors in maritime
casualties and the ICAO human factors digest no. 7 'investigation of human factors in
accidents and incidents' 1993 provide excellent background to what is called the ‘Shel’
model. Shel Model is an alternative way of collecting and storing data in marine
casualties, which involves particular investigating procedures and taxonomies adopted
at the US coast guard.  These documents (IMO/ILO and ICAO documents) bring
together extensive guidelines on gathering human factors information during an
investigation of a marine casualty, incident or near-miss.
The Shel model is particularly appropriate since most accidents are usually a series of
lapses involving instances of human factors related to deficiencies in design,
management, operation, etc which make up either the root causes or many of the
contributing situations, previously mentioned in the dissertation, leading to the accident
or incident.
The IMO investigation process involves six steps: (1) collect occurrence data; (2)
determine occurrence sequence; (3) identify unsafe acts (decisions) and unsafe
conditions; (4) identify the error type or violation; (5) identify underlying factors; and
(6) identify potential safety problems and develop safety actions.  Shel model is a
process providing a step-by-step systematic approach to the investigation of human
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factors.   The Shel model is ideal for steps (1) and (2).  It serves as an organisational
key to investigator's data collections which avoids problems because:
1. it takes into consideration all the important work system elements;
2. it promotes the consideration of the interrelationships between the work system
elements; and
3. It focuses on the factors, which influence human performance by relating all
peripheral elements to central human elements.
In Alexander C. Landsburg's words, the components of the Shel model are Liveware
(the individual and human to human interface); Hardware (human to machine interface);
Software (human to system interface); and Environment (human to environment
interface).
As mentioned before, while the Mozambique coast is very vulnerable to this danger of
accidents, it is rather unhelpful for the purpose of preventing or minimising them this
lack of legal and purely technical proceedings necessary to establish the facts and
recover the damages.  For example, based on statistics from the report of Nordic
Consulting Group (NCG) on Maritime Safety Development Program for SADC coastal
states and Malawi, issued in March 1996, between 1993 and 1995, 227 accidents
involving fire on board were reported to have occurred with 197 lives lost. Out of
those, only two were investigated.  Moreover, the establishment of inquiry committees
is done on ad hoc basis as and when a marine accident or incident occurs.
The need to investigate accidents has been emphasised in the governmental Decree no.
34/94, 1st of September that creates SAFMAR, where the general introduction to it
acknowledges the necessity to prevent Mozambique coast from the lack of control or
occurrence of spills of pollutant products that would endanger people's lives,
property and the marine environment.  Specifically, in article 8 paragraph (d), it goes
on to be precise that it is SAFMAR's responsibility to conduct inquiries into the
marine casualties.
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 It is therefore necessary that the government sets up suitable infra-structure comprising
inquiry committees with qualified and knowledgeable personnel in the use of different
investigation models, who can objectively investigate the accidents/incidents.  These
persons should be given due authority so that they can solicit the co-operation and help
from necessary sources.
For example, the table below highlights the high number of accidents and incidents as
well as the lives lost in relatively short period of time, which call upon the authorities
for appropriate measures.
Table IV/1
Accidents at sea reported in Mozambique
Year No. of casualties Main causes Deaths
1993 120 Fire
1994 84 Fire
1995 23 Fire
Total 227 - 197
Source: Modified from the NCG report  on Maritime Safety Development Program for SADC
coastal states and Malawi, March 1996.
4.2 The organisational and individual factor
Latent failures or underlying factors relate to conditions that may exist within systems
or organisations, which given the right combination of circumstances, may contribute to
an unsafe situation.  They include such conditions as, organisational, design,
maintenance, communication failures, and others.
As stated before, it may be relatively easy to identify human contribution in accidents.
However, to determine with certainty the source of such factors can be very difficult.
One reason for such difficulty can be the long chain these factors follow in the
organisation from the top management down to operational aspects.  Equally, it is
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important to remember that the human factor's chain can also start earlier, during design
of a ship.
In fact, the causes identified from previous accidents are going to be critical for risk
assessment and to find the priorities of actions for future avoidance.  Although this is a
very general and strategic approach as mentioned above which involves a cultural
change, requires setting up policies for safe operations and safety conscious behaviour.
It is an important and critical approach to consider.
Similarly, as far as safety at sea and STCW 95 implementation are concerned, the chain
of responsibility requires a three-sided net comprising the following:
· Administration's role
· Companies' role, and
· Seafarers' role.
It is indeed administration's role to ensure that training and assessment of seafarers are
administrated, supervised and monitored in accordance with the requirements of the
regulations I/5, I/6, I/8 and I/10. In addition, it is also administration's role to ensure
that:
- on-the-job training scheme is in place;
- There is an approved assessment program of the in-service training scheme; and
- Careful endorsement scheme of certificates approved by the administration is in
compliance.
Companies are made responsible, through regulation I/14, for competence,
familiarisation and crew co-ordination training onboard, beyond of course the need to
ensure appropriate certificates for their seafarers, and to comply with the manning
requirements.  The ISM Code emphasises the same requirements.
Regarding seafarers, they are made individually responsible for their capability to
effectively communicate and for their competence, in addition to the required training.
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A study by the DMI, classifies in two the potential safety hazards in maritime work as
related to the human factor:
· Latent human error - involving social, moral and design hazards; and
· Active human error - involving co-ordination, communication and
performance hazards.
Either of the two errors are caused due to the strategies adopted by the management, on
board or ashore.
Regarding latent human error, following are some of relevant remarks to take into
consideration.  Social hazards of an organisation comprise problems inherent to the
organisation and the economy of shipping, insurance, freight and others so related.
These are the social aspects within which the company may be heavily involved and its
decisions positively or negatively influenced.  In Mozambique, for example,  decisions
concerning safety aspects of a ship are very much dependent upon the freight the
companies earn and also upon the economical situation of each.  The number of crew
members, for example, in several shipping and fishing companies is dictated by the
capability of a company to pay salary rather than by the manning requirements of each
ship.
Pressure of IMO requirements or from SAFMAR concerning implementation of
standards have different response because of economical situation of the companies.
Moral hazards of work, which comprise problems of applicability of rules and
regulations, ineffective procedures, including work ethics, determine the dissemination
of the requirements in each company, as to how much control is required from
SAFMAR and also the introduction of safety culture and accidents and incidents
reporting.
The design hazards of man-machine interaction involves the companies to have proper
understanding of engine instrumentation and its layout while purchasing ships and
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equipment. SAFMAR plays the sole role of making sure that the purchased ships are
safe as far as IMO and national requirements are concerned.  The companies are
responsible for making sure that the man-machine interface is effective.  This includes
of course, how the crew interacts with the ship's engine standardisation and how
familiar they are.
The active human error and co-ordination hazards of co-operative work involve
problems in maintenance planning, in task allocation and in distribution of
responsibility and control.  Ship maintenance is one of the subjects, which was
comprehensively looked at in the dissertation.  Both the MET institution and the
companies must prioritise this as being of a critical importance.  It was mentioned also
that the communication hazards may not be critically important in Mozambique taking
into consideration that not many shipping or fishing companies employ foreign seafarers
with whom communication is a problem.
Concerning performance hazards of human perception and attention; which comprises
perceptual errors, errors of attention, individual errors (slips, lapses, misapplications,
and mistakes), it was also mentioned the problem of engine ratings tending increasingly
older, the age-related problems such as poor eye sight reflexes, inflexibility, lack of
vigour, and lack of refresher or upgrading training.  This goes back again to the
companies' responsibility.
4.3 The technical and operational factor in engine operations
It is very important that the shore management understands all the company procedures,
which are safety related and the individual goal they are intended to achieve.
The ISM Code requires written procedures, which are clear for everyone to
understand.  For example, when NAVIQUE nominates a superintendent engineer for
ship or ships, he is required to be able to understand the crew 'language' regarding
maintenance planning of listed items in the engine room.  The same applies to the newly
enforced requirement of a designated person (DP).  The fact though in most private
shipping and fishing companies in Mozambique is that in most cases neither the
superintendent has sufficient technical and professional background, nor he is aware of
his full responsibility and the procedures to follow.  If the superintendents and now the
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DPs have their work under control through written procedures, as required, the
maintenance planning would be continuously updated and followed to the line.
In the author's opinion, lack or ineffective maintenance that results from lack of spare
parts for example should not be acceptable.  This is a clear indication of both
inefficient superintendence, bad shore-ship co-ordination and performance hazards
within the whole organisation.  The superintendent is the link between the shore
management and the chief engineer.  Similarly, regarding safety aspects, the DP is also
a link between the two sides of the organisation.
On the other hand, the fact that the ships are usually very old, as previously mentioned,
forces the engine room personnel to work much more on remedying repairs rather than
in preventive maintenance.
As far as SAFMAR's section for ship surveys is concerned, emphasis should lie on
maintenance planning and how far the personnel have fulfilled their scheduled duties.
Letting a ship leave the port with a fire pump still awaiting repair is an outstanding risk
for which the surveyors are required to take corresponding measure.  It is to be
remembered that the NCG report showed that over the period starting from 1993 to
1995, the prevailing cause for accidents in Mozambique has been fire on board.  The
solution of the problem would be firstly to determine the main reasons of fire and
eliminate them and secondly to equip the ships with proper means of fire fighting, kept
in well maintained ready to use conditions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion and Recommendations
_________________________________________________________
_
5.1 Conclusion
The representative cases, which were taken as sample to reach this stage are very
limited in number as it is not possible, for the scope of this dissertation, to include all
the accidents that have occurred in and around Mozambique.  But, they still demonstrate
reasonably the pattern of shipboard accidents that occur in Mozambique and the
consequences they might lead to.
The establishment of SAFMAR in 1994, has already been a great and right step
towards solution of the many problems related to the human factor in shipboard
engineering operations and others, in Mozambique.  This institution will need to
accumulate experience in safety aspects including the human factor issues, implement
proactively national and international requirements, and act effectively whenever a
problem arises.
Throughout this dissertation, problems resulting from the action or lack of action by the
maritime industry including SAFMAR, were enumerated and evaluated.  Specifically,
the author indicated the tendency towards purchasing old ships to add to the existing old
fleet, which makes maintenance, the working conditions for the engineer officers
important issues.   There is also the need to follow the old advice to put emphasis on
preventing accidents through application of lessons learnt from experience.
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Other important issue discussed was better structure within maritime organisations in
general to help enhance efficiency and effectiveness which were said to be much
dependent upon the investment on human element aspects.  The manning agencies are
definitely participating parties in the whole net which contribute towards avoiding
accidents at sea and so their familiarisation with applicable national and international
instruments is of a great importance.  In fact, substandard crew, it is to be remembered,
almost certainly means a substandard ship.
This goes in line with another issue discussed which concludes that there has to be
training school for engine ratings.  Further, there has to be an effective replacement
policy and process to ensure young and trained seafarers get in to replace the ones
retiring.
Another conclusion to draw is that there are power differences, cultural backgrounds
and traditions almost everywhere in life.  Regarding ship's safety, non-effective
communication among crewmembers due to these factors must be addressed by the
SMC and DOC issuing organisations. Moreover, the company's Safety Management
System (SMS) must conform to STCW requirements. The quality system comprehends
assessment of  both the ISM and STCW implementation process.
It is an issue for most of shipping companies in developing world including
Mozambique, to address the lack of funds availability to resolve all the needs of
maintenance, safety, spare parts, human element, and others.  This is a real problem, but
lack of commitment by management is even worse.
Whereas it will take still long until the shipboard machinery installation reach common
international standards of design and layout, such as ISO standards, the industry in
Mozambique under co-ordination of the administration can minimise the hazards which
result from the differing standards on ships' machinery and layout, and thus make it
safer.  This could be done by purchasing ships from the same origin or built under same
standard rules.
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Finally, the duration of a watch on Mozambique ships is to be closely monitored by the
shipping and fishing companies, but mainly by SAFMAR.  SAFMAR can enforce
regulations on this account and the companies ensure compliance with the STCW
'fitness for duty' requirement for hours of work arrangements.
A number of very important IMO and mainly ILO Conventions is very important to
comprehensively address the human factor issue in shipboard marine engineering
operations.  Some are ratified but not incorporated in the national legal framework,
others are effective.  Not only Mozambique needs their enforcement, but also the no
more favourable treatment clause, surely to be enforced under the Indian Ocean MOU
on PSC, will require implementation of these relevant international instruments.  In
summary, the key issues to address for minimising the human factor contribution in
shipboard marine engineering operations are as follows:
_____________________________________________________________________
1. Old ships are put at work;
2. Lack of proper maintenance;
3. Deficiency in familiarisation with applicable legislation by the manning
organisations;
4. Substandard crews, especially engine ratings (lack of training schools for engine
ratings);
5. Lack of better and effective replacement process (retirement);
6. Lack of commitment from top management within organisations;
7. Defective arrangements for hours of work and resting periods (fitness for duty);
8. Ratified IMO and ILO conventions not monitored or incorporated in the national
legal system;
9. Lack of proper investigation procedure, data collection and adequate legal regime
10. Lack of crewing agencies with knowledge in the applicable instruments.
_____________________________________________________________________
The scope of the dissertation is limited and cannot analyse all the accidents that have
taken place in Mozambique, however these sample accidents analysed have, most of the
times, indicated involvement of human factor.
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Nevertheless, it is to be born in mind that it is the responsibility of the industry to avoid
accidents from not happening and not of the administration alone.  In other words, even
if the laws are well designed and well implemented, if the industry in the end does not
obey or at least participate, they will surely be void.
5.2 Recommendations
1. It has already been realised that conventions and regulations for safety at sea are
many and quite comprehensive and that if they were properly and effectively enforced,
a good deal of improvement would have been achieved.  This shows that the problem
lies on the edge of their implementation, which is very very low even with the political
will.  To be specific, although Mozambique has already ratified the SOLAS
Convention, which is considered to be the most comprehensive IMO convention, and
the STCW Convention, which addresses the human aspects' side, there is still a need to
incorporate and ratify the following IMO and ILO relevant conventions which have a
great influence on the human factor issues:
IMO:
- STCW-F 95 Convention, concerning standards of training for fishing vessels'
personnel
ILO:
- Convention 73, concerning medical examinations;
- Convention 109, concerning wages, hours of work;
- Convention 133, concerning crew accommodation;
- Convention 134, concerning prevention of occupational accidents; and
- Convention 147, concerning (minimum standards) merchant shipping.
2. Not being member however does not impair the country from taking advantage of the
experience comprised in those instruments to enforce in Mozambique.  For example, the
problem of minimum age mainly in fishing companies requires adequate action.  Even
though there is no data to refer to, regarding deaths of seamen at sea engaged in fishing,
it is widely known this is a reality in Mozambique.
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3. Taking into consideration the long Mozambique coastline (2650 km), the need for
effective coast guard and the need for skilled maritime labour in the industry will all be
evident in near future. So, the MET institutions should be viable.  One way for that
would be to hand over the ENM, working today under the Ministry of Transport and
Communications (MTC); and the Fishing Training School (EPM), working under the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAP); to the Ministry of Public Education
(MINED), or to the public Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM), which are
specialised educational and training institutions.  Both the MTC and MAP, through the
maritime authority SAFMAR, should then take the co-ordinating role to ensure
compliance with the applicable international instruments.
4. In this way, the shipping and fishing companies would be involved in ensuring their
financial feasibility through payments of scholarships either of the students employed or
via public taxes.  In addition, both the STCW 95 and the STCW-F 95 (not in force yet)
require record book which should then be designed collectively with the shipping and
fishing companies to be approved by the administration (SAFMAR).
5. The authority, the companies and the MET institutions should prioritise maintenance
planning, as it is known that most ships are old and maintenance schedules must then be
enhanced a step further.  In fact, scholars today consider that training in shipboard
maintenance should be included in the new convention.
6. There is also a need for SAFMAR to establish a permanent maritime accident
investigation branch.  This should be purely technical and professional comprising
experienced people to undertake purely comprehensive technical investigation on the
accidents and incidents as they arise.  It should not be politicised, nor can it be seen as
a danger for anyone in the system.  The reports are to be taken as a lesson, including for
training purposes at the ENM and EPM.
7. Considering the age profile of ships and the poor maintenance conditions it would be
advisable that it is made a national regulation that the shipping companies employ
qualified and experienced marine engineers as superintendents ashore to control and
co-ordinate proper maintenance of ships. This arrangement will be similar to the
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requirement of a designated person (DP) ashore required by the ISM Code. The
information flow should run between these people, the superintendent engineers and the
SAFMAR surveyors for better control.
8. The ISM Code requires today a Designated Person (DP).  Of course, SAFMAR also
here must play a part in appointment of this person.  SAFMAR should make sure that
this DP is sufficiently knowledgeable to undertake safety issues.  To monitor the
implementation of ISM Code at the national level, especially in the major ports of
Maputo, Beira and Nacala.
9. SAFMAR will also need skilled auditors for ascertaining proper implementation of
ISM Code   requirements. The selected persons should be properly trained in ISM and
PSC matters.
10. Creation of crewing agencies that are in compliance and familiar with the
applicable IMO and national requirements should be encouraged especially by the
maritime authority SAFMAR.
11. Provision of the engine display diagrams and layout for shipboard marine
engineering operations both in Portuguese and in English languages.
12. Establishment of a permanent examination committee for seafarers, comprising
educated, trained, knowledgeable and experienced people in maritime subjects
especially those for Nautical, Radio and Marine Engineering subjects.
13. Delegate but under strict control, some of the items under flag state enforcement to
classification societies for tougher surveys and inspections in the implementation
especially on Mozambique flagged ships.
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